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GETTING A HANDLE ON COVERAGE DECISIONS: 

IF.NoT CASE LAW, THEN WHAT? 

Comments on a Paper by Professor William Sage 

MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN· 
Professor Sage has written an important paper on an important issue. The 
lack of good empirical work on health law in general, and on the activities of 
health insurers in particular, is a serious impediment to sound policy making. A 
good example is the controversy over genetic discrimination in access to health 
insurance. Much has been written lately about the problem,) but no one has any 
idea of how widespread or serious the problem may be. Without this 
information, it is difficult to determine the appropriate public policy response. 
I am persuaded by Professor Sage's arguments that case law is a poor source 
ofempirical data on coverage decision making by health care insurers. However, 
I am less optimistic than he appears to be that any good sources of quantitative 
data on the subject will be forthcoming in the near future . Let me explain why. 
First, Professor Sage seems to feel that good empirical data are available in 
one area of health law, namely, medical malpractice. He states that "medical 
malpractice data are far more organized and accessible,,2 than data on health 
insurance coverage, declaring for example, that "data on nationwide jury awards 
are available from Jury Verdict Research . . .."3 However, the Jury Verdict 
reporting system, which, as Professor Sage recognizes, is based largely on self­
reporting by attomeys,4 is generally regarded as incomplete and unsuitable for 
quantitative research purposes.s Indeed, some of the most basic questions that 
we might want to ask about the health care system, such as whether malpractice 
incidence is higher in managed care organizations than in traditional fee-for­
service settings, remain unanswerable given the present state of our data. 
This makes it all the more discouraging that for coverage decisions we lack 
data even as good as that we have on malpractice. As Professor Sage recognizes, 
knowledge of coverage decision making is critical to enable us to determine 
• Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
\. See, e.g., Paul R. Billings et aI. , Discrimination as a Consequence ofGenetic Testing, 
50 AM. 1. HUM. GENETICS 465 (1992); Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination. Insurability 
and Legislation: A Closing ofthe Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL'y 551 (1996); Kathy L. Hudson 
et aI., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Needfor Reform, 270 SCIENCE 
391 (1995). 
2. William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe 
L 'Dei! or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REv. 49, 59 (1998). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 
1093, 1113 n.63 (1996) ("Because [Jury Verdict Research] does not provide information about the 
number of awards in its data base, there is no way to tell how thoroughly it represents the entire 
universe of awards. "). 
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whether patients are obtaining access to new or experimental medical 
technologies; to identify the criteria third-party payors are using to make these 
coverage decisions; and, ultimately, to discern how private health care rationing 
schemes are operating in our present healthcare system.6 Clearly we need this 
information. The question is, where and how can we get it? 
Professor Sage suggests at the end of his paper that these data will be 
forthcoming from academic health centers, pharmaceutical companies, 
government-mandated reports, and the managed care organizations themselves.7 
While I agree with Professor Sage that some additional data will be available 
from these sources in the future, I am pessimistic that we will obtain easy access 
to substantial amounts of useful information. To understand why, let me list the 
types of actions we need to know about in order to have a good understanding of 
what is happening in the realm of coverage decision making. 
1. Whether or Not a Person is Insured.-First, a third-party payor could 
refuse to cover health care services for an individual by declining insurance to 
that individual. Therefore, to have a complete picture of coverage, we would 
need information on insurability decisions by insurers. We also would need to 
know whether employers offer health care plans to their employees, and, if so, 
what types of plans they offer. Finally, we would need to know what choices 
enrollees or potential enrollees make when they are offered plan options by 
employers or within the insurance market in which they reside. In the Cleveland 
metropolitan area, for example, employees not offered access to Rainbow Babies 
and Children's Hospital through their health plan would most likely not have 
coverage for the specialized services that hospital provides. 
2. Premium Levels.-A second wayan insurer could decide not to cover 
services for an individual is to price coverage beyond the individual ' s ability to 
pay. Therefore, a complete picture of health care coverage would include 
knowledge of the premiums associated with different types of plans or coverage 
options, along with the co-payment and deductible rules for each option. 
3. Pre-existing Conditions.-An insurer may try to avoid covering a service 
by declaring the condition for which the service is required a "pre-existing 
condition.,,8 We would need to know insurers' policies on pre-existing 
conditions and understand the impact of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 19969 on those policies. 
4. Recommendations by Primary Care Physicians:'-One of the most 
difficult types of coverage decisions to discern is the information primary care 
physicians give to their patients about the suitability of particular services for the 
6. Sage, supra note 2, at 50. 
7. [d. at 73 . 
8. A "pre-existing condition," in general, is one that would "otherwise [be] within the 
coverage of the policy, [but] which existed prior to [the policy's] effective date." GEORGE 1. 
COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE § 41A: 17 (2d rev. ed. 1982). Specific definitions of 
what constitute "pre-existing conditions" may vary among insurance companies. 
9. Pub. L. No. 104-191, I \0 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.c., 
26 U.S.c., 29 U.S.C. , and 42 U.S.C.). 
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patient, the availability of those services in the geographic area, and coverage of 
those services under the patient's specific health care plan. Particularly in 
managed care plans offering financial incentives to physicians for discouraging 
patients from obtaining expensive health care services, the physicians may make 
implicit coverage decisions simply by not informing patients about the benefits 
of a specific service. For example, Henry J. Aaron and William B. Schwartz 
have shown that physicians in Britain avoided providing kidney dialysis to 
patients over the age of fifty-five simply by not informing the patients of the 
availability of dialysis services.1O 
5. Referral Decisions by Gatekeepers.-Managed care organizations 
increasingly use a system whereby primary care physicians, placed in the role of 
gatekeepers, are expected to restrict patient access to costly services. For 
example, the physician may decline to refer the patient to a specialist within the 
plan, or to a specialist outside the plan, or to a facility within or outside the plan. 
All of these decisions are denials of access tantamount to negative coverage 
decisions. 
6. Outright Coverage Policy.-Third-party payors typically include 
coverage language both in their policies and in that portion of the policies 
provided to enrollees as their description ofcovered services. To my knowledge, 
no one has made a comprehensive compilation of policy language from third­
party payors around the country. Moreover, much of this policy language is 
vague, as Professor Sage recognizes in his description of the role of judicial 
oversight. I I Thus, one would need to know how the general policy language is 
interpreted in practice by the health plan. In trying to determine the coverage 
policy under various state Medicaid programs, for example, we have had to 
survey the programs directly to determine whether or not they cover a specific 
technology for a specific patient population. Even so, some responses indicate 
that to a large extent Medicaid makes coverage decisions on a case-by-case basis 
regardless ofthe general statutory language governing Medicaid coverage policy. 
7. Utilization Review Decisions.-A primary example of case-by-case 
interpretations of policy language is utilization review decisions by health plan 
personnel. These include pre-certification decisions authorizing hospital 
admissions, extensions of lengths-of-stay, and authorization for specific 
procedures. 
8. Decisions by Plan Medical Directors.-Decisions interpreting general 
policy language and utilization review decisions by administrative personnel may 
be reviewed by medical directors when challenged by enrollees or their 
providers. We need to know the fate of these challenges. 
9. Claims Determinations.-Another way in which coverage decis ion 
making takes place is through retrospective utilization review. This includes 
decisions by third-party payors not to reimburse providers and/or enrollees for 
services already supplied. These refusals color future recommendations by the 
10. H ENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING 
H OSPITAL CARE 101 (1984). 
II. Sage, supra note 2, at 58. 
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providers to patients and influence future efforts by the same enrollees to obtain 
similar services. Over time, reimbursement decisions may shape general plan 
coverage policies. 
10. Judicial Review.-Finally, we come to the focus of Professor Sage's 
paper: cases in which courts review coverage decisions by third-party payors. 
Given our need for much or all of the foregoing data to give us an accurate 
picture of coverage decision making and its effect on enrollees in our health care 
system, how available is this information at this time? We have some 
information on who is insured and who is not and some information on employer 
insurance practices. Although enrollees should have policy language for the 
plans in which they are enrolled, no one as yet has attempted to gather this policy 
language in one place, and any effort to do so would be hampered by changing 
circumstances, such as plans coming into and going out of business, and changes 
in policy language. We do have judicial opinions, but Professor Sage has done 
a superb job of persuading us how limited that database is for our purposes.)2 
Given that so much of this information is not available at this time, is 
Professor Sage correct in predicting that it will become available in the near 
future?)3 Professor Sage seems to think that we will get a good deal of it from 
the managed care organizations themselves. But why should they gather this 
information? They are primariJy interested in data that would affect theiL 
profitability, and therefore in information about the behavior of providers within 
their network or providers being considered for membership. Therefore, we 
might expect them to gather information on provider practice patterns and 
referral decisions, mentioned in items four and five above. But it is unlikely that 
health plans would have an interest in gathering much ofthe other data we desire. 
Moreover, even if they collected the data on practice patterns and referrals, or 
indeed any of the other data on our list, why would they make this information 
public? Assuming they did make it public, how could we verify the accuracy and 
completeness of the information they disclosed? Even if an isolated managed 
care organization gave us access to this information, how could we be sure that 
what we learned from it reflected the practice in other managed care 
organizations? 
The primary force driving the behavior of health care organizations is 
increasing competition. Should we expect competition to lead third-party payors 
to publicize their coverage decisions in order to gain a competitive advantage? 
This is hard to imagine. What health care plan, for example, would want to 
advertise that it covers an expensive service that other plans do not? Would this 
not lead to adverse selection by enrollees? 
Professor Sage does not rely exclusively on the private sector to provide 
access to coverage decisions. In addition, he states that "government will 
mandate reporting by the full range of regulated entities, and will make that 
information available to researchers.,,)4 Again, I fear this is too optimistic. The 
12. Id. at 61-68. 
13 . Id. at 73 . 
14 . Id. 
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one potential source of good malpractice data is the National Practitioner Data 
Bank and it is true that this database has been created by the federal government. 
But the data are not accessible to researchers, let alone to the public. IS Nor does 
it appear that the government is making a systematic effort to ensure that 
reporting to the National Practitioners Data Bank is accurate and complete. Even 
if the government were to require similar reporting for coverage decisions, we 
would be hard pressed to ensure that they too were accurate and complete. 
Furthermore, would the government take this step when doing so would increase 
the administrative burden on third-party payors? If the answer is that medical 
records will be computerized and therefore much easier to retrieve and analyze, 
does this not raise privacy questions that might block government data collection 
efforts? Finally, how could the government obtain information on referral 
_ practices and recommendations by primary care physicians? The only way 
would seem to observe physician office practice directly, a solution either 
impractical, unethical, or both. 
So far I have only been talking about getting information from third-party 
payors themselves. Another potential source of information might be enrollees. 
Some studies of discrimination and access to health care services, for example, 
have relied on self-reporting by enrollees or potential enrollees.16 But it is well 
recognized that patient self-reporting is inaccurate, biased and incomplete. An 
interesting possibility is to identify and contact enrollees to get their permission 
to access their medical records, and then to analyze the records to ascertain what 
coverage decisions may have been made in their cases. Gerald Hickson and his 
associates have used a similar technique to determine why patients who have 
arguably been the victims of medical malpractice file c1aims.1? But this promises 
to be an extremely expensive and laborious process, and it is unclear whether 
sufficient information could be ascertained by this method. 
In conclusion, I want to stress two points. First, the difficulty of obtaining 
data in no way diminishes our need for it. Second, I think we are going to be 
limited to more theoretical, extrapolative efforts to examine coverage decisions 
for the foreseeable future. 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 11137 (1994). 
<" 	 16. See E. Virginia Lapham et aI., Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives o/Consumers, 274 
SCIENCE 621 (1996). 
17. Gerald B. Hickson et aI., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Perinatal injuries, 267 lAMA 1359 (1992). 
